Why Benjamin Netanyahu Couldn't Pull Off His Last Political Escape Act

Why Benjamin Netanyahu Couldn't Pull Off His Last Political Escape Act

For nearly thirty years, Israeli politics revolved around a single, reliable rule. Never bet against Benjamin Netanyahu. Whenever the polls looked grim, whenever his coalitions fractured, whenever indictments or war fatigue threatened to bury him, Israel's longest-serving prime minister found a way to bend the Knesset's math to his will.

Until October 27, 2026.

Ahead of Israel's first national election since the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks, the central question in Jerusalem wasn't about ideology. It was whether Netanyahu—now 77 and having held the premiership for more than 19 cumulative years—could execute one final escape act. He ran the exact playbook that had saved him before, framing the vote as a binary choice between himself and a government propped up by Arab parties. Yet when the Central Elections Committee certified the final tallies on November 4, the magic had finally run out.

Netanyahu's right-wing and ultra-Orthodox bloc collapsed from 68 seats down to 53. His opponents—led by former Israel Defense Forces chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot, who was officially tapped on November 8 to form the next government—captured a decisive anti-Netanyahu majority in the 120-seat parliament. Still, beating Netanyahu at the ballot box and actually governing Israel without him are two very different problems.

The Referendum That Replaced Left Versus Right

If you try to analyze Israeli elections through a traditional Western lens of economic left versus conservative right, you'll miss the entire story. Over the past decade, Israel's political map compressed into two rival camps defined entirely by one man: pro-Bibi and anti-Bibi.

That binary kept Netanyahu in power for years because his opponents couldn't agree on anything other than wanting him gone. Right-wing nationalists like Avigdor Liberman and Naftali Bennett shared almost no policy overlap with left-wingers like Yair Golan of The Democrats. Netanyahu knew this. His entire 2026 campaign strategy relied on exploiting those fractures while energizing his own base through fear.

In the final stretch before the October 27 vote, Likud campaign posters across Jerusalem blared a blunt warning: vote for Netanyahu, or you'll get the Arabs. He accused Arab citizens of turning out in "unprecedented numbers" to tip the scales and pressured smaller far-right factions—including Ofer Winter's Amcha Israel—to drop out so right-wing votes wouldn't be wasted below the electoral threshold.

It didn't work. Amcha Israel stayed in the race, pulling 95,764 votes (1.67%)—thousands of ballots that vanished into thin air without winning a single Knesset seat. More importantly, Netanyahu's core pitch collided with a reality voters couldn't ignore.

Why the "Mr. Security" Brand Finally Broke

For decades, Netanyahu sold himself to hesitant centrist voters as the indispensable guardian of Israeli security—the only leader tough enough to keep Iran at bay and manage the Palestinian conflict. That brand died on October 7, 2023, even if it took three years for voters to deliver their formal verdict.

Look at the promises Netanyahu made after the war began versus what Israelis actually experienced by autumn 2026:

  • Total victory over Hamas: Netanyahu vowed to completely eradicate the group. Three years later, Hamas remained an unresolved insurgency, while hostages and bereaved families spent years demanding a state commission of inquiry that Netanyahu repeatedly blocked.
  • International standing: Rather than securing regional normalization, Israel found itself facing historic diplomatic isolation, international arrest warrants over Gaza, and eroding support among traditional allies.
  • The domestic burden: While secular and national-religious reservists served hundreds of days in uniform across multiple fronts, Netanyahu's coalition fought tooth and nail to protect blanket military draft exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Haredi men.

That last issue broke the camel's back. You can't ask middle-class families to send their kids to war for three years while passing laws to shield your coalition partners' constituents from the draft. Even former Likud voters walked away.

Enter Gadi Eisenkot. A former IDF chief of staff who lost his own son in Gaza, Eisenkot is the exact opposite of Netanyahu's theatrical, combative style. He isn't a fiery orator. He speaks quietly, avoids populist slogans, and projects sober institutional competence—what many Israelis called the "un-Bibi". His new party, Yashar!, surged to become the second-largest faction in the Knesset with 21 seats (15.98% of the vote), trailing Likud's 27 seats (20.42%).

Inside the 2026 Knesset Math

To understand why Netanyahu's loss doesn't automatically guarantee a stable replacement, you have to look closely at the final seat distribution certified by the Central Elections Committee. In Israel's proportional representation system, a party needs 61 seats out of 120 to form a majority government.

Here is how the 120 seats broke down across the major blocs:

Netanyahu's Right-Religious Bloc (53 seats total)

  • Likud: 27 seats (1,167,591 votes)
  • United Torah Judaism: 7 seats
  • Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power): 7 seats
  • Shas: 6 seats
  • Religious Zionist Party: 6 seats

The Zionist Opposition Bloc (48 seats total)

  • Yashar! (Gadi Eisenkot): 21 seats
  • Beyachad (Together, led by Naftali Bennett): 12 seats
  • The Democrats (Yair Golan): 8 seats
  • Yisrael Beyteinu (Avigdor Liberman): 7 seats

Arab-Majority Parties (19 seats total)

  • The Joint List: 11 seats
  • Ra'am (United Arab List): 8 seats

Notice the trap hidden inside those numbers. Combined, every party opposed to Netanyahu holds 67 seats—a comfortable majority. The Zionist opposition alone only commands 48 seats, which is 13 short of the 61 needed to govern. Meanwhile, Arab-majority parties surged to a record 19 seats, buoyed by high turnout among Arab citizens and Bedouin communities who mobilized directly in response to Netanyahu's campaign rhetoric.

Why Forming a Government Is Still a Minefield

On November 8, President Isaac Herzog handed Gadi Eisenkot the formal mandate to assemble a ruling coalition. Nine days later, on November 17, the anti-Netanyahu majority flexed its muscles by electing Eisenkot ally Matan Kahana as Speaker of the Knesset, ousting Netanyahu loyalist Amir Ohana.

Installing a new speaker was the easy part. Controlling the Knesset floor allows Eisenkot's camp to advance legislation—including an independent state commission of inquiry into October 7 and a new military draft law—before a cabinet is even sworn in. Actually building a 61-seat cabinet, though, forces Eisenkot, Bennett, and Liberman into an uncomfortable corner.

During the campaign, Eisenkot, Bennett, and Liberman all pledged not to rely on Arab parties to form a government. Yair Golan of The Democrats has openly urged them to drop that taboo and govern with the backing of Ra'am and The Joint List, arguing that 67 seats is a clear democratic mandate. Yet Bennett and Liberman represent hawkish, right-leaning voters who fiercely resist any coalition dependent on Arab factions, especially after Netanyahu spent weeks delegitimizing Arab participation as "election interference" and claiming fraud—claims the Central Elections Committee flatly rejected.

What are the alternative paths? None of them look painless.

  1. Outside support from Arab parties: Ra'am or parts of The Joint List could abstain or vote from the outside to allow a minority Zionist coalition to pass its initial confidence vote without sitting around the cabinet table. Even that requires Bennett and Liberman to walk back campaign promises.
  2. Peeling off ultra-Orthodox parties: Eisenkot could theoretically invite Shas (6 seats) or United Torah Judaism (7 seats) to ditch Netanyahu and join the government. That math works on paper (48 + 13 = 61), but it would require gutting the opposition's signature promise to end Haredi draft exemptions—an instant dealbreaker for Liberman and Eisenkot's base.
  3. A national unity government with Likud: If coalition talks deadlock and Israel faces yet another snap election, pressure could build for a broad unity coalition between Yashar! and Likud. Netanyahu has already tried to weaponize Likud's status as the single largest party (27 seats) to argue he deserves a rotation at the top, though Eisenkot has ruled out serving under him.

How to Read Israeli Politics Over the Next Few Weeks

If you're watching the coalition negotiations in Jerusalem unfold, ignore the daily noise and leaked threats from party spokespeople. Watch three concrete indicators instead:

  • Watch the Knesset speaker's docket. Now that Matan Kahana holds the gavel, look at how fast the opposition moves bills establishing an October 7 state commission of inquiry and banning a prime minister under criminal indictment from forming a government. If those bills pass rapidly, Netanyahu's leverage inside Likud will evaporate.
  • Watch Ra'am's Mansour Abbas and Joint List leaders. Pay attention to whether they demand formal cabinet ministries or signal willingness to provide a parliamentary safety net from the outside in exchange for municipal budgets and anti-crime policing in Arab towns.
  • Watch Likud's internal discipline. Netanyahu has survived for decades by preventing any successor from emerging inside his own party. If it becomes clear that Likud is heading to the opposition benches solely because other parties refuse to sit with Netanyahu personally, senior Likud figures may finally start calculating what comes after him.

Netanyahu couldn't pull off his greatest trick this time because voters finally decided the cost of keeping him was higher than the fear of replacing him. Whether Israel gets a stable new era or another round of parliamentary paralysis now depends on whether his rivals hate Netanyahu more than they fear making compromises with each other.

SM

Sophia Morris

With a passion for uncovering the truth, Sophia Morris has spent years reporting on complex issues across business, technology, and global affairs.